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Abstract: This paper contends that soft computing can help us investigate the 
aesthetics of digital computation. Employing broader conceptions of aesthetics and 
perception, and whilst drawing upon the ontology of Alfred N. Whitehead, it uses soft 
computing to address the 'prehensive' dimension of the quantitative procedures of 




This paper will argue that soft computing may be of relevance to the field of 
computational aesthetics. By focusing on the theoretical foundation of aesthetics in 
computation, I will show that soft computing can highlight the indispensible role 
played by abstract processes within the construction of experience. 
Soft computing is a rapidly advancing area within computer science. It is 
characterised by an attempt to deal with uncertainty, approximation, randomness, 
and partial truth, and some of its most prominent examples include neural networks, 
fuzzy logic and evolutionary computation. ‘Soft’ techniques differ from traditional 
computing as they employ diverse methodologies in order to cope with the difficulties 
involved in achieving and maintaining algorithmic efficiency. Their originality and 
appeal lie in their ability to provide inexact, indeterminate and generative solutions to 
‘computationally hard’ problems (i.e. questions that are too complex to be addressed 
via classic computational systems). 
I will contend that soft computing can offer a means of investigating the 
aesthetic dimension of digital computation. However, ‘aesthetics’ will be understood 
here in a manner that exceeds the disciplinary bounds of a theory of art or beauty: in 
keeping with its etymological roots (‘aisthesis’), it will be taken to denote a theory of 
relationality and perception.  One further qualification: ‘perception’ will not be viewed 
as referring solely to human cognitive faculties. Just as aesthetics will be understood 
in a non-anthropocentric sense, so too will perception: it designates the ways in 
which experience is constructed, thus referring to the manner in which we encounter 
things and to the ways in which these things encounter others in turn. Consequently, 
‘prehension’ may be a more appropriate term than ‘perception.’ I take this suggestion 
from the work of the philosopher and mathematician Alfred N. Whitehead, within 
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whose ontology prehension plays a special role: it refers to the most foundational 
type of relation – the extrasensory awareness that all actualities have of earlier and 
future occasions – and is used to explain how all entities within the realm of actuality 
are acts of experience. Such experience is not the exclusive domain of human 
consciousness. All actualities are in fact held to experience one another, whether 
they are conscious or not, as the data that they inherit from past occasions leave 
them internally connected.1 
Whitehead’s ontology and the broader notions of aesthetics and perception 
that I have drawn from it allow us to view computational structures as possessing a 
relational dimension that exceeds both their phenomenical effects and the 
intentionality of their users. My contention is that computational structures can be 
understood as systems of actual occurrences: they are concrete ‘facts,’ fully realised 
actualities, particular to their own spatial and temporal occasion. To focus only on the 
performative and qualitative character of these events, however, is insufficient. In my 
view, factuality itself is enabled by levels of quantitative, logico-mathematical 
abstraction. In a computer science context such abstractions are usually understood 
as computing’s modus operandi: those methods or processes that follow a well-
defined procedure and describe how a task is to be performed. Yet I would argue that 
logico-mathematical abstraction also constitutes the ‘form’ of computation itself, i.e. 
its potential character, the pattern that defines its ontological possibility. My interest 
here is in presenting computational structures both as facts (actual instances, events) 
and as forms (patterns of potentiality). The aesthetic relevance of computation, in my 
view, lies in the irreducible relationship between the two. I will show that soft 
computing practices emphasise this interrelationship of fact and form, and thereby 
highlight crucial, although largely unaddressed, issues within computational 
aesthetics. 
The relevance of this approach can be illustrated by looking at current 
understandings of computational aesthetics, but in order to do so I need to make a 
brief qualifying remark on digitality. Computation and digitality are by no means 
synonymous, yet both can be understood as processes of discretisation: 
computation, by virtue of its axiomatic character, involves the discretisation of 
procedures; likewise, digitalisation can be seen as the technological automation of 
those discrete procedures. I will focus on the discrete aspects of both computation 
and digitality below, as in doing so we can underline the fact that contemporary 
computational aesthetics has overlooked the prehensive dimensions of quantities. 
This is important, as the concept of prehension affords a relation between the 
discrete and the continuous that has eluded contemporary computational aesthetics’ 
attempt to connect the digital to the analogue. Media and cultural theorists, computer 
scientists and philosophers still disagree on an exact definition of digitality, but they 
do seem to view the digital as a discrete data technology that uses discontinuous 
values to access, represent and manage information. Yet, at the same time, the vast 
majority of philosophical, cultural and social accounts of aesthetic experience portray 
a universe of percepts and perceivers, the reciprocity of which is established by a 
rapport of continuity with what is given in experience. Hence the difficulty that digital 
aesthetics seems to be faced with: where the digital tends to be understood in terms 
of the discrete, aesthetics tends to be understood in terms of the continuous, or the 
analogue. The discrete nature of numerical and data quantities is thus largely omitted 
from aesthetic considerations of the digital medium. These accounts are often geared 
towards analysing its perceptual, performative, and phenomenical effects, which are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Free Press, 
1978). 
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possessed of characteristics often associated with the analogical. Codes, scripts, 
values, parameters and algorithms are viewed as performing actions, which in turn 
exhibit qualities and properties. Agency and quality thus appear to be key to the 
disclosure and employment of the aesthetic value of computation. These approaches 
risk dismissing the mathematical and logical nature of computational digital media. If 
the latter is specifically addressed, it is done so in a manner that understands the 
ontological power of logico-mathematical abstraction only in terms of continual 
calculation; this tends to be characterized as ‘topological’ in nature and expression, 
and flattened onto a plane of differential transformability. I, however, would like to 
propose that the impasse between continuity and discreteness could be re-thought in 
the light of the prehensive dimension of computational structures, as prehension 
exists before and beyond any performance, action, or effect. The approach that I am 
arguing for would retain the possibility of working with the reality of algorithmic 
entities by addressing the aesthetic dimension of their quantitative, discrete 
procedures. 
Soft computing can help us explore these issues, for it serves to highlight that 
the rules and quantities of algorithmic construction are always involved with patterns 
potentiality, and that these patterns are themselves expressed by abstract logical 
processes. It thus illustrates the importance of the interrelation of factuality and 
formality within computational structures. There are a number of ways to prove this 
speculative hypothesis, but I will attempt to do so here by looking at the empirical and 
rational characteristics of soft computing methodologies. 
As noted at the outset, soft computing uses uncertainty and randomness to 
solve problems that humans are adept at, but which classical computational 
methodologies struggles with (face recognition or linguistic disambiguation, for 
example). Whilst indeterminacy is considered undesirable in the classic theory of 
computation, soft computing exploits it in order to obtain tractability, lower solution 
cost and a certain economy of communication. The metaphoric ‘softness’ of this 
approach is meant to afford an alternative to the ‘rigidity’ of the conventional analytic 
methods that found the classical theory of computation. Soft computing can thus 
appear more tuned to the ‘empirical’ levels of reality than traditional computation, as it 
seems to allow factual chance into its algorithmic formality. This point is perhaps 
proved by its ability to solve tasks that involve information gained from or modified by 
experience, such as the industrial application of intelligent systems geared towards 
solving ‘real life’ tasks (e.g. control, modelling and simulation). Soft computational 
systems have also been utilized in social science contexts, where adaptation to 
imprecise judgment, sense perception and emotion is key. 
Generative algorithms provide an example of soft computation’s relation and 
frequent association with the empirical. Chance, I would contend, is particularly 
important for generative algorithms, as they encode formal rules via the application of 
a bottom-up approach designed to encompass contingent change over time. The 
programmer deliberately writes very simple instructions, and lets complex behaviour 
emerge through an iterative selection process, which picks the best representations 
of solutions, rejects bad results, and produces new ones from those that survive the 
procedure. Generative algorithms are therefore able to modify their own code, 
allowing new combinations to arise from parallel and random behaviour, and thereby 
simulating natural selection and biological evolution.2 This process fosters autonomy 
and uniqueness, and has in consequence been employed by artists as a means of 
playing with the underlying rules of formal generation and structure. It however also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Melanie Mitchell, An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1998). 
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offers an interesting prompt for us to speculate as to the ways in which empirical 
factors – in the guise of variation, selection and evolution – can enter the formalism 
of computation. 
The example of generative algorithms illustrates that soft computing can be 
seen to be characterised by an empirical aspect. Yet this does not mean that soft 
computing dismisses logic and formality: where others have emphasised its 
orientation towards the empirical, I would argue that its most interesting theoretical 
implications lie in its indirect continuation of what might be called a ‘rationalist’ project 
of optimization, compression and synthesis. 
My point is that soft computing, despite its openness to contingency, still 
operates within the rational, disciplinary bounds of mathematics and logic. This can 
be seen in fuzzy logic systems. Whilst the traditional method of computation uses 
binary logic, which permits only a dichotomous opposition of true and false, fuzzy 
systems compute via a logic that allows for differing truth values: they are thus able 
to reflect the imprecise definitions of language, and can engage with complex control, 
management and recognition problems that cannot be framed in ‘crisp’ terms. The 
fundamental idea behind fuzzy logic is that all things exist in degrees, and that we 
are in consequence bound to encounter imprecision in truth. Fuzzy logic responds to 
this (as does the seminal fuzzy set theory first outlined in 1965 by Lofti Zadeh)3 by 
trying to tune knowledge representation, so as to make artificial systems function 
more like humans. Like the generative algorithms described above, fuzzy logic thus 
accommodates the contingent conditions of experience, but in capturing loosely-
defined categories and generalising them it remains a formal model; so too does the 
generative algorithm, which puts forth a problem-solving strategy in terms of a set of 
axiomatic rules evolved upon a specific yet formally addressed situation. In sum: 
although many have associated the merits of soft computing with this orientation 
towards the empirical, I would argue that it is this formal dimension that constitutes its 
real potential. 
This claim can be developed by looking further at fuzzy logic. The latter is a 
logical calculus designed to build a formal system capable of handling information 
devoid of analytic formulation. Fuzzy logic, however, also produces a logico-
mathematical structure that can be computed, and which can be put into the finite 
terms that machines require in order to operate. One can therefore comment that the 
rationalizing power of soft computation stems from its capacity to enlarge the realm 
of actuality, through accommodating factors that could not be encompassed by 
mathematical formalization. Soft computing has consequently been viewed as 
incorporating a degree of quality into the computational process, as it can be 
interpreted as a quest to capture the ‘continuity’ of things through approximation. 
Imprecision would then seem to arise from a continuum possessed of degrees that 
can be broken down into ‘fuzzy’ chunks. One can see how this project can perhaps 
be associated with the ‘analogical’ digital aesthetic perspectives discussed above, 
which frames aesthetics in terms of the continuous transformation of perceptual 
qualities. Yet, in my view, fuzzy logic is also characterised by attentiveness to the 
implicit rationality of the real: its focus rests not on binary calculation per se, but 
rather on the inherent possibilities of calculation itself. Thus, contra those who would 
claim that the importance of soft computing lies in its attention to quality, I would 
argue that it returns us to the significance of the quantitative in computational 
aesthetics. 
Fuzzy logic’s advocates often emphasise that the technique uses imprecise 
indicators instead of exact values. However, I believe that if we look at the manner in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Lotfi A. Zadeh, “Fuzzy Sets,” Information and Control 8, no. 3 (1965): 338–353. 
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which fuzzy systems deal with vagueness we are brought back to a question implied 
by Alan Turing’s classical theory of computation, which he set out in 1936: how could 
one devise an ‘effective method’ composed of finite terms that might be able to put 
the infinity of quantities into the finite terms of a procedure?4 Such a method would be 
a process of discretisation, as is the method by which fuzzy logic deals with 
vagueness. Briefly, fuzzy logic works through a system of sets with graded members; 
each grade is possessed of a different truth value, and each member thus forms part 
of a smooth but differentiated continuum. One might read this as an attempt to turn 
quantity (discrete grades) into quality (varied continuity), and to create a means of 
computation that comes a little closer to ‘reality’. However, I would hold that it in fact 
remains just as reliant upon the quantitative and the discrete as Turing’s theory of 
computation, as soft computing’s ability to cope with the uncertain is itself grounded 
on the quantitative nature of computational formality. Fuzzy logic doesn’t render 
quantity qualitative by attributing continuous characteristics to it: rather, the 
mathematical processes that allow fuzzy systems to accommodate approximation 
are themselves based on the procedural and axiomatic modes of quantitative 
abstraction. 
It is important to stress now that the observations above locate soft computing 
within a broader debate about the limits of formal reasoning. These limits were 
envisaged by the logician Kurt Gödel in 1931,5 and subsequently framed in terms of 
computability by Alan Turing in the 1936 paper mentioned above. Turing’s famous 
thought experiment, the so-called Turing Machine, established the theory of 
computation by demonstrating that there are limits to what can be computed. His 
account has however received criticism over the last two or three decades, and much 
of this has involved framing his model as a closed formalism that doesn’t allow for the 
influence exerted by the external factors of contingent reality upon its purely internal 
world of algorithmic procedures. This brings us back to soft computing, which as we 
have seen is engaged in an attempt to ‘open’ formalism to contingency. Yet, in my 
view, it is not by introducing the empirical that we are afforded a more ‘open’ 
formalism; rather, this openness is already granted by virtue of the fact that 
computation has intrinsic limits. I would contend that Turing cast uncertainty and 
randomness as intrinsic features of his model of computation by discovering the 
notion of the uncomputable, as this means that computation becomes defined by that 
which it is not: the formal logic of the algorithmic method is consequently always 
already ‘open’, as it tends towards its own limits. 
We are thus returned to the import of the quantitative in computational 
aesthetics. We have seen that soft computing attempts to introduce the empirical into 
its calculations. Yet we have also seen that it does so without fully abandoning the 
rationality of the formal method. So, rather than focusing on soft computing’s 
accommodation of contingency, I would argue that we should instead take soft 
computing as an illustration of the manner in which quantity is always already 
involved in the qualitative. This point can be made on two levels: firstly in terms of 
computer science, and secondly by way of reference to the philosophical ideas 
sketched at the outset of the paper. We should note that computing systems function 
through discrete processes: through axiomatic structures that operate via finite, and 
thus quantitatively distinct steps. Quantity also grounds the logical forms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Alan M. Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem,” Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 2, no. 42 (1936): 
230–265. 
5 Kurt Gödel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related 
Systems, trans. B. Meltzer (New York: Dover Publications, 1992). 
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computational structures, as it defines and shapes their possible configurations. Yet 
in Whitehead’s ontology, as described above, reality itself is a succession of actual 
facts. Each is informed by a prehensive relation with other facts, and each has an 
equally prehensive relation to the quantities of their potential patterns. Earlier I 
described such patterns as the forms that enter into these actual facts. If we now 
consider these patterns of potentiality as the logical and mathematical forms of 
computational structures, then we would have a means of according computational 
aesthetics a far broader reach than has commonly been ascribed to it. 
In conclusion, I believe that one of the most interesting issues that can arise 
from this way of thinking about soft computing is an awareness of the mutuality 
between factuality and formality. Soft computational structures are factual, as they 
are computational events with an actuality. In other words, they are acts of 
experience, as they inherit their constitution through the prehension of other acts of 
experience. This is their factual existence which, by virtue of this relationality, is 
possessed of an aesthetic dimension that is not uniquely reliant upon the contention 
– common amongst the approaches to aesthetics described above – that 
computational processes exhibit effects, agency and quality. I would also stress here 
that soft computing structures have a formality, and that this is expressed through 
their logico-mathematical character. For example, the procedure by which generative 
algorithms operate varies with contingent change: the factuality of this computational 
structure thus has a relation with the empirical world. In its factuality, however, it 
needs also to refer to what we referred to as ‘forms’ above, i.e. its logico-mathematic 
pattern, and this relation to ideality can once again be termed prehension. It is here, 
beyond the phenomenological outputs of computational structures, that we find the 
real ontological motive force of their interrelation. The forms of computation can thus 
be seen as an ontological, existent reality, and not just as a type of deductive 
reasoning that contrasts with the direct experience advocated by inductive 
approaches. Aesthetics, in this sense, is not the subjective judgement of the 
perceptual experiences that a computational structure presents to us; instead, it is 
the relation between factuality and formality. Although soft computing is limited in the 
degree to which it can help us develop this position, I believe it can help us shift 
contemporary discourse towards the issues that are indicated here. 
